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Political Participation and Civic Engagement: a Crisis of 
Involvement?* 
Arguments about the alleged crisis of political participation and civic 
engagement are relatively common these days. From electoral participation 
to associational life, involvement in the public arena is said to be declining 
(Putnam, 1995a and b, 2000). Citizens are becoming more critical and are 
also more distrustful ofdifferent social and political institutions (see the 
collection of articles in Norris, 1999a and Pharr and Putnam, 2000). Civic 
malaise discussions are, again, defining the research agenda of political 
science. Although several studies and publications have already 
established that there is no justified reason to speak about a “crisis of 
democracy” (most notably, Kaase and Newton, 1995; Klingemann and 
Fuchs,1995; and Norris, 1999b), some authors make the case of, at least, 
a crisis of engagement. In this vein, Putnam has argued in several of his 
works (1995a and b, 2000) that the American public is ever less engaged in 
public affairs. Some of Putnam’s theses about engagement decline have 
already been counter-a gued by several European researchers (Norris, 
1999b and 2002; De Hart and Dekker, 1999; Hall, 1999; Selle and 
Strømsnes, 2001). Other pieces of evidence were already there before 
Putnam started to promote his own view of the situation. In this sense, Topf 
(1995) noted that, with the exception of Spain and Finland, the political 
action repertoire had been increasing since the 1980s. Similarly, 
Gundelach (1995) found that grass-roots activity had increased in most 
European countries, again but in Spain. 
 As we see, even if the general argument of civic engag ment 
decline is probably not applicable to all western countries, some of the 
available evidence would suggest that this could be the case for Spain.  
 Most Spanish analysts seem to agree that, after a period of greater 
citizen mobilization before, during and immediately after the transition to 
democracy Spaniards retreated from politics and regained their traditional 
passivity (Linz, 1971 and 1981; Maravall, 1981: 28-31; McDonough, Barnes 
and López Pina, 1984; Sastre, 1995 and 1997; Torcal, 1995). Some 
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authors even argue that the Spanish transition to democracy was not 
particularly accompanied by a mobilized citizenry, since the transition was 
mainly elite-driven and Spanish political parties intentionally pursued a 
strategy of demobilization to facilitte elite agreements (Sastre, 1995 and 
1997). This version has, nevertheless, been contended by other 
researchers that argue that conflict was much more present than it is 
usually admitted (Desfor Edles, 1998). In any case, the general consensus 
would be that political participation and civic engagement has been 
declining in Spain lately. Could we, then, be facing one of Hirschman’s 
(1982) waves of retreat to the private sphere? 
 In addition, Spain stands out as one of the western countries with 
lower levels of political participation and civic involvement. Together with 
other southern European nations, Spain shows some of the lowest levels of 
interest in politics, political discussion and associational membership (see 
Figure 1 and Table 1). Accordingly, Spain has been described as a 
demobilized and apathetic society.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Figure 1. Membership in all types of associations - Eurobarometer 50.1 (1998)
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Political involvement: Spain in the European context 
 No interest Never discuss Not close to any 
 in politics politics political party 
 1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998 1987 1990 1996 
 WVS EB EB WVS EB EB EB EB EB 
Denmark 14 6 4 20 22 27 29 38 36 
Germany 15 12 12 20 20 19 32 38 48 
Netherlands 24 11 8 26 24 36 23 20 28 
Luxemburg  17 15  31 42 46 47 38 
U. Kingdom 28 15 22 37 31 48 48 46 53 
France 26 23 24 37 36 37 45 45 39 
Greece  14 27  16 55 30 24 45 
Italy 47 28 24 47 32 36 33 40 39 
Ireland 46 28 34 51 43 48 57 60 60 
Bélgium 54 31 28 56 47 40 48 54 47 
Spain 40 45 33 30 54 35 62 57 49 
Portugal  41 39  56 56 33 42 25 
EU average 33 23 22 36 34 40 40 43 42 
Sources: WVS=World Values Survey, EB=Eurobarometer. All figures are 
percentages 
 
There is no fundamental debate around this description of Spanish 
society. However, this paper discusses the truth in the more pessimistic 
visions of political participation in Spain. Are Spaniards re lly less engaged 
in politics than they were 20 years ago? 
Ever Less Engaged? A Descriptive Approach to the 
Spanish Case 
Although political participation has received a certain degree of 
attention from Spanish pollsters, the time series we already have are far 
from perfect. Interestingly enough, leaving aside voting, nonconventional 
forms of political participation are much more frequently among the forms 
of political action included in Spanish surveys. Thus, we are able to give a 
fuller account of the evolution of protest participation in Spain. 
 A first thing we note from a descriptive exploration is the absence 
of a general trend of decreasing citizen engagement with politics. Figures 2 
to 6 show the evolution of various forms of citizen involvement and 
participation between 1980 and 20001. If anything, we can argue that there 
 7 
is no single pattern of increasing or decreasing engagement for Spanish 
citizens. While some forms of involvement are becoming more popular, 
other seem to remain more or less stable.  
Spaniards have, although modestly, become more attentive to 
political affairs (see Figure 2). The available data show a certain degree of 
instability or measurement error, but it seems safe to say that –at le st– 
involvement in politics has not decreased since the 1980s. Quite on the 
contrary, newspaper readership has been constantly increasing until the 
mid-1990s, political discussions are more frequent nowadays than two 
decades ago2, and political interest has remained within levels of 20-30% 
with periodical ups and downs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Political involvement in Spain
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In what regards the different forms of political participation, I will 
use here the classical distinction between conventional and 
nonconventional action for illustrative purposes3. To the extent that we can 
find no homogeneous pattern within each type of political action, this 
distinction is not very useful for our longitudinal analyses. Some 
conventional actions (see Figure 3) are nowadays more frequent, 
Figure 3. Conventional political participation in Spain
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Figure 4. Electoral participation rates in Spain
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particularly attending political rallies and convincing others how to vote, 
than in the 1980s and the rest have remained at stable levels. In addition, 
electoral participation rates (Figure 4) have not systematically declined in 
the last two decades. Ups and downs are frequent and pronounced 
depending on the electoral cycle, but the high abstention level of 2000 is 
not very different to that we had in 1979. Therefore, with the exception of 
party membership, there has apparently been no retreat from the political 
arena for Spaniards after the so-called “honey-moon” with democracy in 
the late 1970s-early 1980s. And even in the case of party membership, the 
trend has not been of a constant decline, but rather of stability after an 
initial period of adjustment. If we turn to protest action (Figure 5), the 
pattern is clearly one of increasing citizen engagement in the political 
arena4. Participation in strikes and in demonstrations, and signing petitions 
is now more common than twenty years ago. Between 20 and 35 percent 
of the Spanish adult population have protested in any of these forms5. On 
the other hand, more aggressive forms of political participation have 
remained at constant and reduced levels in Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Protest action in Spain
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Civic engagement, as measured by associational membership, has 
not declined either. Quite on the contrary, Spaniards seem to be more 
involved in associational life than they were two decades ago (Figure 6)6. 
However, this general trend of increasing membership has not benefited 
the more politically oriented associations. Neither political parties nor trade 
unions have been able to boost their membership figures and they have to 
content themselves with stable trends (Figure 7). Similarly, the so-call d 
“new politics” associational world has not been able to attract Spanish 
citizens to their organizations (Figure 8). Although Spaniards are now more 
willing to join different sorts of protest initiatives, they do not seem willing to 
commit themselves further. The one exception is the slight increase in 
membership rates of human rights and 3rd World development groups. This 
is mainly due to the growing popularity of all sorts of NGOs, which is a 
more general phenomenon in western countries, and is still reduced in 
magnitude in Spain as compared, for example, with the Netherlands o  
Belgium (see Morales, 2002). Increases are not widespread either if we 
consider membership of other types of associations (Figure 9)7. Finally, 
although the increasing levels of engagement in associations are mostly 
Figure 6. Associational membership in Spain
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reduced to single memberships, multiple memberships have also increased 
in the last decades (see Figure 10), thus contributing to reject the idea of a 
decline in civic engagement in Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Party and trade union membership in 
Spain
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Figure 8. "New politics" associational membership 
in Spain
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 As we see, a purely descriptive approach to the evolution of citizen 
engagement in Spain since the 1980s shows no support for a hypothesis of 
declining involvement in politics. In the last twenty years Spaniard’s 
psychological involvement with politics (interest, discussion and newspaper 
readership) seems to be increasing, conventional forms of political 
Figure 9. Membership of several types of 
associations in Spain
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participation are mostly stable or slightly decreasing, electoral turnout is not 
in decline, mild forms of protest action are becoming more popular, while 
the more aggressive forms have remained stable, nd associational 
memberships are modestly increasing. 
 However, it might well be that while we find no aggregate pattern of 
civic disengagement, fundamental social changes are taking place that will 
bring in the short or medium term a decline in citizen involvement in Spain. 
The civic orientation and behaviour of the various generations that form our 
society may be very different. A generational approach is needed to 
properly evaluate the hypothesis of a decline in civic engagement in Spain.
A Generational Approach to the Evolution of Citizen 
Engagement in Spain 
 As a “young” democracy, Spain is still in the process of 
constructing a consistent political culture. Many students of Spanish politics 
and society (Montero and Torcal, 1990; Torcal, 1992; Torcal, 1995; 
Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1998; Torcal and Montero, 1999) have 
stressed the importance of generational differences in attitudes and 
behaviour and of generational replacement for the process of attitude 
change in Spain. A generational approach to the evolution of citizen 
engagement in Spain will allow us to test two different hypotheses.  
On the one hand, Putnam’s arguments about the decline of civic 
engagement (2000) introduce the hypothesis that it is the older 
generations, mainly those who were the adult population in the post-World 
War II, the ones to have starred the “golden age” of civic engagement (at 
least in the US). We have already seen that in Spain there has been no 
such decline during the democratic period, however we might think that 
generational replacement could in the medium term produce a decline in 
civic engagement if the younger generations are less prone to get involved 
in the public arena. That is, even if there has not existed a golden age of 
civic involvement in Spain, there might be a “civic generation”; a generation 
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with outstanding levels of civic participation when compared to other 
generations.  
A second hypothesis that this type of analysis will enable to test is 
related to an alternative view of generational replacement and political 
involvement, which relates to the specificities of the Spanish case. As 
mentioned before, Spanish students of democratic political culture have 
argued that democratic behaviours and attitudes will, if anything, expand in 
Spain with generational replacement. From this point of view, the younger 
generations, already educated and socialised in a democratic environment, 
will bring with them attitudes of greater legitimacy and support for 
democracy. If this is the case we would also expect generatio al 
replacement to foster citizen political involvement and democratic practices, 
rather than a decline in citizen engagement. 
Nevertheless, both hypotheses could be confounded by a parallel 
process of change in participation patterns; or, as Pippa Norris (2002) has 
recently put it, with the reinvention of political activism. Longitudinal and 
generational trends could well vary substantially across types of political 
engagement. In fact, according to Putnamian-style accounts we would 
expect younger generations to become increasingly disengaged from the 
more conventional and traditional forms of participation: voting, electoral 
and party politics, and traditional associational memberships. While 
following Norris (2002) we would, in addition, expect the youngr t  engage 
more enthusiastically in new forms of participation and in protest 
behaviour8. Thus, the generational analyses that follow will distinguish 
between different forms of civic engagement in order to get a clearer 
perspective. 
Figures 11 to 15 show the generational patterns of engagement of 
five political generations9 for different forms of participation in electoral and 
party politics. A quick analysis of these graphs uncovers mixed results and 
patterns.  
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Figure 11. Vote in general elections and political generations 
in Spain
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Figure 12. Convincing others how to vote and political 
generations in Spain
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Figure 13. Attending political rallies and political generations 
in Spain
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Firstly, not in all cases are generational differences neither 
statistically nor substantially significant. Working for a political party and 
being a party member are so rare forms of political participation that 
generational differences are in most years negligible. Generational 
differences are most noticeable for voting and convincing others how to 
vote. 
Secondly, the patterns we see are a mixture of cohort and age 
effects. It is true that the younger generations, the 1980s and 1990s 
Figure 14. Work/time for a political party and political 
generations in Spain
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Figure 15. Party membership and political generations in 
Spain
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cohorts, are less likely to participate in any form of electoral and party 
politics. However, it is also true that, as the years go by, both generations 
gradually approach the behaviour of their elders. This is most clearly seen 
with regard to voting in general elections (Figure 11), but it is a general 
pattern for all forms of conventional participation. And a detailed 
observation of all figures shows that generational differences tend to 
decrease substantially when we reach the year 2000. A similar conclusion 
is to be reached with regard to the oldest generation, the dictatorship 
cohort. In general terms, this generation has been less involved in politics 
than the 1960s and 1970s generations. Nevertheless, in some instances, 
as they have become older, the members of the former cohort have 
become more engaged. In other instances the behaviour of the oldest 
generation is not very different to that of the 1960s or 1970s generation.  
Finally, there is no clear “civic generation” in what concerns the 
electoral and partisan forms of engagement. While the 1960s generation is 
in all cases among the most participatory cohorts, it usually shares this top 
ranks with either the dictatorship or the 1970s generations. In addition, the 
fact that this is the only cohort to have been in their middle years of 
adulthood (between 30 and 60 years) during the whole 20-years period 
makes it difficult to say if it has a really distinctive behaviour as a 
generation or if these results reflect the common “inverted-u” ag  pattern. 
 Are generational patterns the same when we consider protest 
action? As we said before, we could expect higher levels of engagement 
from the younger generation in the more unconventional forms of political 
involvement.  
 Figures 16 to 19 show protest behaviour by cohort in Spain10. A 
first insight we get from the comparison between these trends and those of 
electoral and partisan participation is that generational patterns are 
somewhat different. As expected, younger cohorts are more likely to 
protest than older ones. Another important aspect is that there are no 
substantial differences in the protest behaviour of the three youngest 
generations. Although the 1970s generation tends to be the most active in 
all forms of protest, the 1980s and 1990s generations display – n most 
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occasions– similar levels of participation and sometimes even surpass the 
former (as in strike activity and building occupation). 
 Secondly, cohort effects are much more clear for protest action 
than for electoral and partisan participation. Indeed, the trends for each 
generation are usually quite stable and age effects are not very apparent. 
The dictatorship generation shows the lowest levels of protest engagement 
and the 1960s generation is usually around the average, and these 
patterns do not substantially change as they grow older. Nor do the 
younger generations vary their behaviours as time goes by –beyond the 
common period effects that are visible11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Signing a petition and political generations in Spain
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Figure 17. Demonstrating and political generations in Spain
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 Finally, the trends for protest behaviour show that, while the 
younger generations might not be clearly “reinventing” political activism, 
they are not clearly retreating from politics either. The youngest citizens are 
equally likely to demonstrate and participate in strikes12 as their 
predecessor generations are, and they are not very different to other 
generations in what regards signing a petition and occupying buildings. In 
Figure 18. Striking and political generations in Spain
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Figure 19. Occupying buildings and political generations in Spain
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fact, when the whole protest repertoire is jointly considered –as measured 
by an additive scale13– the three youngest cohorts (1970s, 1980s and 
1990s generations) appear as almost indistinguishable (Figure 20). In this 
sense, it does seem that protest action has already been incorporated to 
the citizenship “tool kit” of Spaniards and that it is here to stay, since the 
younger cit zens are not more passive in voicing their demands than are 
middle age adults.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A final aspect of generational variations in civic engagement that 
we explore in these pages is associational membership. While generational 
differences are clear for protest action, they are less so for these organised 
forms of citizen participation (Figure 21). It certainly seems that the 1970s 
generation is the most engaged in organisations, but it is also the one with 
a more erratic associational behaviour, and it also looks like the youngest 
cohorts are not substantially less involved in associations than one of the 
generally most civic generations: the 1960s generation. In addition, the 
increasing trend of associational engagement is common to the three 
intermediate generations, while the youngest and oldest cohorts show 
more stable patterns. What is, nevertheless, clear is that the dictatorship 
Figure 20. Protest participation and political generations in 
Spain
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generation is, by far, the least organisationally involved –as it was already 
with regard to protest action. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are these patterns the same for all types of associations? Does the 
behaviour of the generations vary depending on the domain of action of the 
organisations? In the next Figures we distinguish between politically –and 
socially– oriented associations (Figures 22 and 23).  
It does seem that the type of organisation is relevant to understand 
the membership patterns of Spanish cohorts. Politically oriented 
associations seem to be far more attractive to the generations that were 
socialised around the transition to democracy: the 1960s and 1970s 
cohorts. Both the dictatorship and the 1990s generations are quite reluctant 
to join these types of groups, while the 1980s generation conforms to the 
average trend. In contrast, the youngest cohorts are both over t e average 
levels of socially oriented associational membership, while the dictatorship 
generation remains the least involved. This fact introduces important 
nuances to the general picture: after all, it might well be that younger 
citizens are not retiring to the private sphere but that they are just in the 
Figure 21. Associational membership and political generations 
in Spain
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process of redefining the type of associational engagement they will 
promote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, we find limited evidence in the Spanish case that 
would support the argument about a decline of involvement from the 
Figure 22. Membership of political associations and political 
generations
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Figure 23. Membership of social associations and political 
generations
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youngest generations. This hypothesis seems to be truer for engagement 
in political organizations and in electoral-partisan politics than for other 
forms of participation. Younger generations are extensively involved in 
protest forms of participation and are engaged in socially oriented 
associations at average levels. In addition, although in many instances the 
youngest generation (1990s) is less involved in public affairs, there seems 
to be a certain age effect that will push thi  cohort towards more average 
levels, in terms of their political behaviour.  
On the other hand, to a certain extent, in the Spanish case it is 
possible to identify two “civic generations” and not only one. Spaniards 
politically socialised during the 1960s and 1970s are, undoubtedly, more 
active in politics than other older and younger generations. Nevertheless, 
the 1960s cohort seems to have concentrated their involvement in the more 
conventional electoral and partisan forms of participation, whereas t 
1970s generation has a wider repertoire and participates extensively 
through protest actions and all sorts of associations. 
 However, the descriptive accounts shown so far, while useful for 
getting the broad picture about trends and patterns, are not very 
informative about the relative importance of generational membership. In 
fact, in many cases there is doubt that many of the patterns we see are to 
be attributed to cohort effects instead of being accounted for by age effects. 
The next section will provide a more detailed analysis of the relative 
importance of age and generational membership. 
A Multivariate Analysis of Generational Differences in 
Civic Engagement 
 Is there really a generational divide in political participation in 
Spain? Or, are the differences in behaviour that we find across the various 
cohorts due to a certain overlap between middle-aged citizens and certain 
generations for the last 20 years? Although the survey data available for 
answering this question is limited, we can test cohort and age effects by 
pooling several datasets from different years together.  
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The multivariate analyses presented in the following pages have 
been estimated from a pooled dataset that combines CIS studies 1237 
(1980), 1461 (1985), 1788 (1989) and 2382- 4 (2000 elections panel)14. 
Forms of engagement have been divided in its main five dimensions: 
voting, electoral-partisan participation, mild forms of protest action, 
aggressive forms of protest action, and associational membership15. To 
reduce the problems due to noncoverage of certain participation items 
across these four surveys, each dimension is measured with a 
dichotomous variable so that participation in any act will identify the 
respondent as a participant in that dimension, and no information on the 
extent of the individual’s repertoire is analysed. Table 2 presents the main 
descriptives of the five dependent variables used in subsequent analyses 
and their distribution across the four surveys pooled in the dataset.
 
Table 2 
Descriptives of the dependent variables 
Year Voting Electoral-partisan Mild protest Aggressive protest Associational  
     membership 
 yes Total N yes Total N yes Total N yes Total N yes Total N 
1980 2089 2666 519 3647 1251 3647 222 3647 1136 3647 
     % 78.4 100 14.2 100 34.3 100 6,1 100 31,1 100 
1985 2874 3652 797 3652 0 3652 0 3652 1048 3652 
     % 78.7 100 21.8 100 0 100 0 100 28,7 100 
1989 2287 3638 158 3648 1622 3648 197 3648 1278 3648 
     % 62.9 100 4.3 100 44.5 100 5,4 100 35,0 100 
2000 3034 3649 298 3649 1930 3648 204 3648 1470 3648 
     % 83.1 100 8.2 100 52.9 100 5,6 100 40,3 100 
Total 10284 13605 1772 14596 4803 14595 623 14595 4932 14595 
     % 75.6 100 12.1 100 32.9 100 4,3 100 33,8 100 
 
 Table 3 presents the results of five logistic multivariate regression 
analyses carried out with the pooled dataset. The main goal of these 
analyses is not to provide good models of each form of engagement, but to 
be able to discern cohort from age effects on the variations in participation 
we have seen in the previous descriptive analyses16. If, when controlling for 
the effects of age, membership of a given generation has a statistically 
significant effect we will be able to argue more forcefully that generations 
behave in a different way. If the coefficients related to the cohorts are not 
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significant we will infer that it is not so much the generation that matters but 
other aspects related to the life cycle. In addition, other variables that might 
be related to a differential participatory behaviour of the various cohorts are 
included. Different levels of education, interest in politics or feelings of 
internal efficacy could be the reason for greater or lesser engagement in 
the public arena. 
 As we see, in all cases generational differences remain even after 
controlling for the effects of age and of other factors17. In the cases of 
aggressive protest action the coefficients of the two youngest cohorts are 
not statistically significant due to the more reduced number of cases for 
these generations. And, in general terms, we already saw that the 
differences between all cohorts for this more rare form of political action 
were quite small in any case. 
 
Table 3 
Multivariate logistic analyses of generational differences in engagement (pooled 
dataset: 1980-2000) 
 Voting Electoral-partisan Mild protest Aggressive protest Associational 
     membership 
 B Sig.Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig.Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) 
Dictat. gen. -0.50 0.00 0.61 0.46 0.00 1.58 -0.76 0.00 0.47 -0.33 0.06 0.72 -0.28 0.00 0.76 
1970s gen. 0.28 0.00 1.32 -0.56 0.00 0.57 0.79 0.00 2.21 0.25 0.07 1.28 0.19 0.00 1.21 
1980s gen. -0.17 0.10 0.84 -1.47 0.00 0.23 1.48 0.00 4.40 -0.11 0.55 0.90 0.21 0.02 1.23 
1990s gen. 0.99 0.00 2.70 -2.10 0.00 0.12 2.31 0.0010.07 0.36 0.13 1.44 0.12 0.36 1.13 
(1960s gen.)             
Age  0.20 0.00 1.22 -0.08 0.00 0.92 0.12 0.00 1.13 0.00 0.93 1.00 0.06 0.00 1.07 
Age square -0.0017 0.00 1.00 0.0004 0.00 1.00 -0.0011 0.00 1.00 -0.0002 0.45 1.00 -0.0007 0.00 1.00 
Education -0.02 0.84 0.98 0.15 0.20 1.16 1.06 0.00 2.87 0.56 0.00 1.74 1.24 0.00 3.46 
Interest pol. 0.85 0.00 2.33 1.51 0.00 4.52 0.63 0.00 1.87 0.84 0.00 2.31 0.63 0.00 1.88 
Int. efficacy 0.04 0.46 1.04 0.29 0.00 1.33 0.59 0.00 1.80 0.70 0.00 2.01 0.43 0.00 1.53 
Male 0.10 0.04 1.10 0.55 0.00 1.73 0.42 0.00 1.53 0.44 0.00 1.56 0.48 0.00 1.61 
Intercept -3.73 0.00 0.02 -0.25 0.44 0.78 -4.86 0.00 0.01 -3.82 0.00 0.02 -2.95 0.00 0.05 
Cox-Snell R2 0.096 0.104 0.170 0.038 0.114 
NagelkerkeR2 0.145 0.193 0.234 0.120 0.156 
N of cases 12,302 12,931 12,931 12,931 12,931 
Note: In black, coefficients significant at p 0.10. Within brackets the generation 
taken as the reference category. B coefficients are unstandardised logistic 
regression coefficients. All variables, except for age, are coded with a range 0-1 
and, thus, these coefficients can be interpreted as the increase/decrease in the log-
odds ratio of being engaged in each of these forms when the independent variable 
changes from its minimum to its maximum values 
 Interesting, and in some cases unexpected, results are obtained 
from these analyses in what regards the relationship between the 
 26 
probability of engaging in each of these forms of participation, the age of 
the individual and the generation to which she belongs. The curvilinear 
relationship between age and engagement adopts different shapes 
depending on the type of participation we consider. These differences are 
best appreciated when we graphically represent the estimated probability of 
participating in each of these forms by age and generation (Figure 24)18. 
 In most cases, engagement levels show the traditional “inverted-u” 
shape; that is, participation increases with age until the late 50s and early 
60s when individuals tend to reduce their commitment, but this reduction 
usually does not reach the lower levels of youth. This is the pattern found 
for voting, mild forms of protest action, and associational membership. 
Different patterns are found for electoral-pa tisan forms of engagement and 
for aggressive protest action. In the former case, involvement tends to 
gradually decrease with age, while in the latter it remains stable along the 
life cycle at extremely reduced levels. 
 In addition, some unexpected results with regard to generational 
differences are worth being pointed. Contrary to what many commentators 
would argue, the youngest generation of Spanish citizens is not less likely 
to vote in general elections. Rather, given that they are very young and that 
younger people tend to vote less, the 1990s generation would seem to vote 
more than previous generations. In other words, if their be aviour remains 
stable –as compared to 2000– we should expect this cohort to turn out in 
elections much more than their siblings, parents and grandparents have 
done19. We should also be optimistic with regard to the tendency to join 
associations of the younger Spaniards. Actually, it is the 1970s and 1980s 
generation to lead in this form of engagement, both in absolute and relative 
terms. The young are not getting disengaged from associations in Spain, at 
least not yet. And our results would indicate that levels of associational 
membership should increase and not decrease in the years to come. 
 Finally, these results would not support either simple conclusions 
about “civic” or “uncivic” generations. It is true that the dictatorship 
generation is usually the least likely to engage in all forms of participation 
except in the case of electoral-p rtisan activities. And it is also true that the 
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1970s generation is frequently among the most active ones. Nevertheless, 
the patterns are mixed and the leading role of g nerations varies greatly 
across types of involvement. This is probably good news, since it indicates 
that rather than a generational pattern of gradual disengagement in Spain 
we have a generational diversification of repertoires. Put simply: different 
generations like to do different things. 
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Figure 24. Age and cohort effects for different forms of civic engagement (predicted probabilities: pooled dataset, 1980-2000)
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In Summary 
Arguments about a Hirschmanian retreat of citizens to the private 
sphere are not adequate for the Spanish case. Spaniards are not strictly 
less active in the political arena now than they were 20 years ago. True, 
some forms of participation have slightly declined or remained stable at low 
levels –especially party membership– but others have been increasing with 
time. On the other hand, associational engagement seems to be growing 
even if citizens, and especially the younger cohorts, seem to prefer the 
more socially oriented organizations.  
 There is no such thing as a “civic” generation in Spain. With the 
only exception of the dictatorship generation, that shows generally the 
lowest levels of engagement, all generations are similarly active in the 
public arena. Only they get involved in different ways. The younger citizens 
tend to prefer protest politics and certain forms of associations, while the 
older ones tend to prefer electoral and partisan types of articipation. Still, it 
is not true that “conventional politics” is out fashioned: the 1990s 
generation is turning out to vote in levels that are extremely high given their 
age. And it does not seem that the young are reinventing activism either. In 
many ways, in Spain the generation that reinvented activism seems to be 
the 1970s generation, who adopted protest politics as a core part of its 
political repertoire. 
Finally, it is not at all clear that generational replacement will 
necessarily produce bettr citizens, or at least not more involved citizens. 
Democratic learning does not seem to be cumulative across generations in 
what regards participation in public affairs. In most cases, the generations 
of Spaniards “born” with democracy are not very diffeent rom their elders; 
they are, however, less willing to become members of the more politicised 
groups. In other words: democracy has not produced a particularly 
“disengaged” generation, but it has not produced increasingly active 
citizens either. Simply, there is no reason why we should be overly 
optimistic or pessimistic.  
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Notes 
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions in 
Turin, March 2002. I wish to thank all participants in workshop 22 on Political 
Participation and Information for their useful comments and suggestions. 
Especially useful were the observations made by Eva Anduiza, Svante 
Ersson, Pippa Norris, Marina Popescu and Larry Rose, which have greatly 
contributed to improve the current version of the paper. 
 
1. Data were obtained from the following studies of the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS): no. 1237 (1980, 3457 cases), no. 1361 
(1983, 1724 cases), no. 1461 (1985, 2505 cases), no. 1788 (1989, 3356 
cases), no. 2105-2107 (1994, 5087 cases), no. 2154 (1995, 3983 cases), no. 
2212 (1996, 2499 cases), no. 2240 (1997, 2490 cases), no. 2384 (2000, 5283 
cases) and no. 2387 (2000, 2484 cases); and from the World Values Surveys 
(WVS) of 1980, 1991, and 1995. 
 
2. The strikingly high estimate for political discussions in 2000 should, probably, 
be attributed to the fact that the survey was conducted immediately after the 
General Elections of March 2000. 
 
3. The distinction between conventional and nonconventional (or protest) forms 
of action is now less useful than it was in 1979 (Barnes and Kaase 1979). 
Western citizens have incorporated to their ordinary repertoires of political 
participation acts that were regarded as highly conflictual in the post-2nd World 
War period. Thus, signing or collecting petitions, demonstrating, or 
participating in strikes have gained a certain “normality” status in most 
democracies. 
 
4. The reader should note that all three waves of the WVS systematically 
underestimate the participation of Spanish citizens when compared to the 
estimations obtained with the surveys done by the CIS. This is more notorious 
for the cases of “participated in demonstrations” and “signed a petition”, 
although also visible for all other forms. It is difficult to say which estimation 
might be more reliable, but given the availability of longer time series for the 
CIS and their apparent smoothness, we could be confident of the better quality 
of estimation of the latter. This is certainly bad news, since the WVS is 
frequently used to compare across countries and, thus, Spanish figures could 
come out as artificially lower than they already are. See Morales (2002) for an 
analysis of similar problems in the cross-national measurement of 
associational membership and for a discussion of its implications for the social 
capital debate. 
 
5. A common problem to all survey items related to political participation is the 
frequent lack of reference to a time frame. Unfortunately, only recently have 
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questions included the reference to the last 12 months. Hence, we can not be 
truly sure whether the increase is really reflecting a trend in participation or the 
accumulation of the last twenty years. Probably a certain combination of both 
phenomena will be true. 
 
6. We should, however, consider this increase with care since measurement has 
not always been consistent across surveys, either national or international. 
The trends of both national and international studies, nevertheless, support the 
conclusion of increasing associational membership or, at least, the absence of 
a decline. In fact, I have chosen for the 2000 time point study no. 2384 
(postelectoral survey) rather than study no. 2387 (political culture survey) 
because, with the same group items and half the sample size of the former, 
the latter gave higher membership estimates (in more than 7%). In this sense, 
my conclusions are, if anything, conservative. 
 
7. The DATA 1993 estimates seem to introduce measurement error rather than a 
real decline in the trend, given that the 1994 point is more consistent with what 
is a generally stable trend. 
 
8. Putnam’s and Norris’ approaches are not necessarily contradictory; it is mostly 
a matter of emphasis. While Putnam (2000) stresses the existence of a 
general trend of decline in civic engagement, Norris (2002) would 
acknowledge a certain degree of decline in engagement in certain forms of 
participation in some countries and adds that there is also a countertendency 
due to a generalised increase in participation in alternative forms of action.
 
9. Any division of the population in generations introduces a certain component 
of arbitrariness, to the extent that drawing lines between years is never an 
exact exercise. The distinction between these five generations has been 
motivated by the different periods in which these cohorts came of age and
were politically socialized. The first generation is that of citizens who were 
born by 1941 and, thus, were socialized in politics during the Spanish Civil 
War and the Francoist regime. The cohort of people born between 1942 and 
1952 is composed by the individuals who came of age during the 1960s, a 
period of increased mobilization against the dictatorship. The 1970s 
generation were born between 1953 and 1964, and lived their late 
adolescence in the crucial moments of transition to democracy. The fourth 
cohort, the 1980s generation, were politically socialized during the first decade 
of democracy which can still be regarded as a post-transition decade marked 
by the attempted coup d’état, the historical Socialist landslide victory, and the 
anti-NATO mobilizations. The last generation is composed by those born 
between 1976 and 1982, a cohort of young citizens who were, majoritarily, 
already born with democracy and politically socialized in democratic 
“normality”. 
 
10. Although sufficient time series were available for “doing graffiti”, “causing 
damages” and “exerting violence” the number of respondents per generation 
that has protested in each of these ways is so limited (sometimes less than 
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15) that the results are not stable along time. Nevertheless, the patterns to 
which they point are very similar to those seen for the least aggressive forms 
of protest. 
 
11. Period effects in all data shown in this paper are most probably a mixture of 
period effects, random variation in survey estimates, and variation due t  
subtle changes in question wordings. 
 
12. The high levels of strike activity among the youngest cohort is to be 
understood in the educational context and not in the labour context. High 
school and university strikes are not infrequent in Spain and youth 
employment levels are, on the contrary, very low. 
 
13. An additive scale was used to summarise all the information of the eight 
indicators of protest action. Constructing such a scale is no easy task, and the 
approach adopted here has been to use factor analyses to explore the 
dimensionality of the various items (see Appendix for more details), which 
show a reasonable degree of unidimensionality. However, factor analysis is 
not a useful means for producing a single coherent scale to be used at 
different time points, since the results are not always as consistent as they 
should for such an endeavour. Therefore, I have opted to give informed 
weights to the different forms of action (see Appendix). A second problem with 
using factor scores is related to the different forms of action listed in each of 
the three surveys used for this task. Hence, for longitudinal analyses, the best 
option seemed to construct a reduced scale of political protest which would 
incorporate only those items present in all three studi s. This protest scale has 
a standardised range of 0-1. 
 
14. The data have been weighted to give equal weight to the four year points 
(25% each). Unfortunately, the lack of a unified battery of participation forms in 
surveys across time limits the possibility of pooling surveys from the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, these four time points cover well our five political generations. 
Two close time points in the mid and late 1980s have been selected because 
one survey incorporates items related to conventional forms of participation 
and the other only includes items on protest action. 
 
15. Electoral-partisan participation includes convincing others how to vote, attend 
political rallies, party membership and give time or work to a political party. 
Mild forms of protest action include participation in strikes and demonstrations, 
and signing petitions. Aggressive forms of protest are: occupy buildings, do 
graffitti, damage things or property, and exert violence. Associational 
membership includes membership in any type of organisation. 
 
16. This notwithstanding, the models do not suffer from big problems of 
misspecification, since the main control variables are included. Objections 
could be made with regard to the noninclusion of variables related to 
mobilisation. However, those factors would be related to period effects that 
would, presumably, affect all cohorts more or less similarly. 
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17. All coefficients related to the generations are to be interpreted by comparison 
to the 1960s generation, which has been used as the reference category. The 
effects of age have been modeled with a quadratic expression, so as to 
properly capture the curvilinear relationship that this variable generally has 
with participation. 
 
18. The reader should bear in mind that these are estimated probability and not 
“real” percentages. That is, these are the shapes of the relationship between 
age, generation and engagement according to the data we have available. 
The estimated probability has been calculated as p = 1/ 1+e-(á +Óâx) with all 
variables fixed at their average or modal value for a male respondent and only 
allowing age and cohort to vary. Thus, the lines represent the change in the 
probability of participating as age varies, and each line represents a different 
cohort. 
 
19. Of course, it might well be that the 2000 elections promoted an unusual 
participation of the youngest citizens. However, there is no reason a priori to 
believe this is the case, since the 2000 elections were not very contested and 
resulted in one of the lowest turnout rates of the past 20 years in Spain. 
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Appendix 
 As a general phenomenon, political participation expressed in its 
different forms of action does show a reasonable degree of 
unidimensionality. Due to the different items included in Spanish surveys 
along time, separate factor analyses for three time points (1980, 1994 and 
2000) were carried out. Two of them (Tables A1 and A2) included 
sufficiently inclusive lists of participation forms, and the other two (Tables 
A3 and A4) include only protest forms of action. Equivalent results are 
found in all of them.  
A first factor seems to be related to a unidimensional latent 
structure of participation. I  this sense, all forms of action load to a 
significant degree in this factor and are, thus, expressing the fact that they 
are all related to a great extent. A second factor –and, in the case of the 
complete list of 1980, the third one– expresses the distinction between 
more and less aggressive forms of protest. This distinction becomes even 
clearer when we consider the results of the factor nalyses of protest action 
forms only.  
With these results as standpoints, an additive protest scale was 
constructed. These were the values assigned to each form of protest that 
were then added into a single scale: sign petitions=1, participate in 
demonstrations=1, participate in strikes=1, block traffic=1.5, occupy 
buildings=1.5, do political graffiti=2, damage things or property=2, and exert 
any violence=2. The final scale was then standardized to a 0-1 range by 
dividing the sum of all values by the maximum possible value. 
 
 
Table A1 
Factor Analysis of participation forms, 1980* 
  Factors 
 1 2 3 
 Demonstrate 0.73 -0.26 -0.20 
 Strike 0.69 -0.28 -0.19 
 Sign petition 0.66 -0.26 -0.19 
 Collect signatures 0.64 -0.14 -0.13 
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 Political graffiti 0.55 0.02 0.26 
 Political rally 0.53 0.39 -0.08 
 Work for party 0.52 0.58 -0.04 
 Block traffic 0.51 -0.09 0.49 
 Community work 0.47 0.43 -0.09 
 Occupy buildings 0.43 -0.11 0.46 
 Persuade how vote 0.43 0.37 -0.06 
 Damages  0.34 -0.04 0.53 
 % variance  30.6 8.9 7.9 
* Maximum likelihood extraction, 5 iterations 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Factor Analysis of participation forms, 2000* 
  Factors 
 1 2 3 
 Graffiti-damages 0.65 -0.44 -0.24 
 Violent action 0.59 -0.43 -0.23 
 Demonstrate 0.53 0.27 0.46 
 Occupy buildings 0.53 -0.09 0.09 
 Strike 0.51 0.19 0.40 
 Contact politicians 0.45 0.18 0.08 
 Sign petition 0.43 0.19 0.36 
 Write to media 0.43 0.08 0.13 
 Time for party 0.29 0.60 -0.48 
 Attend electoral rally 0.24 0.37 -0.19 
 Donate money to party 0.22 0.35 -0.32 
 % variance 21.5 10.8 9.2 
* Maximum likelihood extraction, 6 iterations 
 
 
 
Table A3 
Factor Analysis of protest actions, 1980* 
  Factors 
 1  2 
 Demonstrate 0.78 -0.24 
 Strike 0.77 -0.25 
 Petition 0.67 -0.19 
 Block traffic 0.53 0.49 
 Political graffiti 0.51 0.24 
 Occupy buildings 0.45 0.43 
 Damages 0.34 0.53 
 % variance 35.9 13.1 
* Maximum likelihood extraction, 3 iterations 
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Table A4 
Factor Analysis of protest actions, 1994* 
  Factors 
 1  2 
 Demonstrate 0.64 -0.44 
 Block traffic 0.62 0.06 
 Political graffiti 0.61 0.40 
 Occupy buildings 0.52 0.00 
 Sign petition 0.46 -0.42 
 Violent action 0.46 0.35 
 Damages 0.42 0.37 
 % variance 29 11.3 
* Maximum likelihood extraction, 5 iterations 
 
 
 
